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THROUGH A SCANNER DARKLY: THE USE OF FMRI AS 
EVIDENCE OF MENS REA† 
 
TENEILLE BROWN, J.D.∗ 
EMILY R. MURPHY, PH.D.∗∗ 
 
MR. DE BANATE:  
 
Good evening.  Welcome and thank you for coming to the Journal of Law & 
Health’s last speaker series event this year.  My name is Fil de Banate [and] with 
Adam Saurwein, we serve as the editors-in-chief of the Journal. Last week we hosted 
an event focused on health care policy.  Tonight we are pleased to host an event 
exploring fMRI and its legal significance. 
Although [neuroimaging] is still an emerging technology, it has proven to be very 
consequential in at least one situation.  In September 2008, the New York Times 
reported that a court in India allowed the use of brain scan images in a criminal case, 
which ultimately led to the conviction of an Indian woman accused of poisoning her 
fiancé.  To this day, the Indian woman maintains her innocence.1  Hank Greely, a 
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bioethicist at Stanford Law School and a colleague of our speakers, commented on 
the verdict, [characterizing it as] “both interesting and disturbing.”2  He also wrote in 
the American Journal of Law and Medicine the following: 
If brain scans are widely adopted, the legal issues alone are enormous, 
implicating at least the 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th and 14th Amendments to the 
U.S. Constitution.  At the same time, the potential benefits to society of 
such a technology, if used well, could be at least equally large.3  
Tonight, our speakers who are, as I said, Mr. Greely’s colleagues, will present on 
this topic, but it will be more focused [on] evidentiary issues….Adam will now 
present our speakers. 
 
MR. SAURWEIN:   
 
The Journal of Law and Health pulled some strings this week to welcome our 
guests with a little lake-effect snow. 
Prior to joining Stanford, Teneille Brown practiced law for two years at Latham 
& Watkins in Washington, D.C., where she represented early-stage pharmaceutical 
device companies.  Brown received her undergraduate degree in history and 
sociology of science at the University of Pennsylvania with a concentration in 
bioethics.  While at Penn, she wrote an honors thesis on the ethics of elective 
cosmetic surgery and conducted HIV clinical research.  She also conducted research 
at Penn Bioethics Center and drafted a bill on genetic testing informed consent.  
Brown graduated from the University of Michigan Law School focusing on bioethics 
in medicine and the law.  She assisted in the creation of the Pediatric Advocacy 
Initiative, a legal clinic that offers free services to patients. Teneille Brown is a post-
doctoral fellow at the Stanford Center for Biomedical Ethics, a fellow at the Center 
for Law & Biosciences and a research fellow at the MacArthur Foundation Law and 
Neurosciences Project.  Her academic work focuses on the intersection of behavior, 
biology in the law with particular interest in evidentiary regulatory issues 
surrounding genetics and neuroscience.  
Dr. Emily Murphy is a fellow at the Stanford Law School Center for Law & 
Biosciences and a research fellow on the MacArthur Foundation Law and 
Neuroscience Project based at the University of California, Santa Barbara.  Murphy’s 
current research focuses on issues surrounding the application of neuroimaging -- of 
neuroscience and neuroimaging technology in criminal law and civil law, the effect 
of neuroimaging evidence on individual concepts of the agency and designing 
hypothesis-driven neuroimaging work that can directly inform legal or policy-based  
challenges. Murphy graduated from Harvard University and completed her doctoral 
work in the Department of Experimental Psychology at the University of Cambridge 
while on a Gates Cambridge scholarship.  Her doctoral research examines neural and 
neurochemical bases of impulsivity and behavioral flexibility.  
                                                                
2
 Id. Psychologists and neuroscientists in the United States who have been at the forefront 
of brain-based lie detection characterized the Indian court’s application of the technology to a 
legal case as “fascinating,” “ridiculous,” “chilling” and “unconscionable.” Id. 
3
 Id.; see also Hank T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The 
Urgent Need for Regulation, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 377 (2007). 
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Join me in welcoming our guests. 
 
MS. MURPHY:   
 
Thank you so much for having us here today.  It is interesting to see snow, as 
we’re from California now.  You’ll forgive us if we’re slightly casual in our 
presentation style.  If there’s anything that’s incredibly unclear technically speaking, 
please let us know.  But if we can, we’ll hold some of the bigger questions for the 
end.  We have tried to leave time for that. 
Today we’re representing our paper which was, as we found out last night – we 
found out this paper, which is titled “Through a Scanner Darkly:  fMRI as Evidence 
of Mens Rea,” is going to be published in the Stanford Law Review, Volume 62. So, 
we’re pleased to have the opportunity to present to you guys and to get feedback that 
we can incorporate into the final draft of our paper. 
We’re going to talk briefly about neuroscience and law in general.  You’ve 
probably been hearing more and more about that in the media and in other law 
reviews and in other law contexts.  We think this paper fills a necessary gap in 
discussing what is admissible, what is not admissible, what purposes different brain 
imaging technologies can be used for.  And so, we hope that this will become a real 
touchstone of this field as it starts to grow.  
I should comment that the India case,4 we were pleased to learn that as of 
December, the woman who was convicted and her husband, who was convicted as 
well, although he did not undergo the brain scanning technology, were released on 
bail because there were many other evidentiary flaws in the case.5  So, we don’t 
know how that’s proceeding other than that, but things seem to be looking up, and 
are going to. 
We’re here today because this technology is quite literally on our doorstep. This 
is the cover of last year’s California Bar Review which strongly suggests that if there 
are such things as truth and lies and violence that need to be sorted out, surely we 
can find the answer somewhere in our brains.  And as a neuroscientist, I have to say: 
Everything is in our brain. Obviously every action, every thought, every social 
interaction, everything we’ve ever learned is all represented somewhere in our brain.  
It does not mean—and this is going to be the take-away of the point—that the 
technology, these technologies to extract such information from our brains, are 
perfect or that they will ever be perfect to the degree that people are hoping for.  And 
we think this matters because it’s already being used in courts. 
California v. Savinon was a case brought to our attention a couple weeks ago.  
The defendant was accused of attempted murder.  He, after losing his job, becoming 
incredibly despondent and breaking up with the victim, went to her house stalked her 
for several hours, attacked her, duct-taped her into the car seat and tried to suffocate 
them both with carbon monoxide. He entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by 
reason of insanity on the basis that because of his major depression and his recent 
carbon monoxide exposure, he could not have formed the requisite intent to kill her, 
                                                                
4
 See supra note 1.  
5
 See Emily Murphy, Update on Indian BEOS Case: Accused Released on Bail, Stanford 
Center for Law & the Biosciences Blog, Apr. 2, 2009, available at 
http://lawandbiosciences.wordpress.com/author/emilyrmurphy/ (last visited June 1, 2009).  
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setting aside the fact that he then drove her home and bandaged her wounds and gave 
her the phone to call 911. The claims were going to be supported—and this is why 
we were contacted—by the testimony of William Klindt, who runs a brain scanning 
clinic in San Jose and who planned to rely on functional brain images of the 
defendant taken six months after the fact to support the claims of major depression 
and carbon monoxide poisoning, neither of which are medically approved uses for 
this particular brain scan. The prosecutor was, in our opinion, rightly concerned 
because she worried if she gets these brain scans in front of the jury, that’s going to 
be incredibly convincing.  And this was a hypothetical case that landed in our laps 
after we had written this paper, but this is exactly what we’re concerned about, and 
we’ll explain why. 
The other reason it matters is because it’s available all over the place. There is no 
FDA regulation of this, of brain scanning industries, and there are many. This is just 
a sampling of the third party companies, where you can go and get your own brain 
scanned.  Two of the targets for greatest criticism have been this company, No Lie 
MRI,6 which was also involved in a recent case in the last two weeks in San Diego—
Teneille will talk more about that.  The company offers such services to people as 
risk reduction in dating and issues concerning the underlying topics of sex, power 
and money.  You can see that there are suggested customers: lawyers, law firms, 
government, corporate customers, individual customers, anybody who values the 
truth. Another egregious offender in our perspective is the Amen Clinics7 in Newport 
Beach which offers SPECT scans, which are radiological scans looking at blood flow 
to different parts of the brain for many purposes, including, you’ll notice, legal 
issues.  On this website are many reported case studies of said legal issues, 
particularly those explaining the brain’s basis of the violent behavior of several 
people facing criminal charges.  Again, you think this is not a good use and Amen’s 
testimony has indeed been challenged in court, and rightly so. 
There are many different types of brain scanning technologies that have come 
into the courtroom and that we expect to see in the future.  Today we’re focusing 
specifically on fMRI, which stands for “functional magnetic resonance imaging.” 
Other methods or tests that I mentioned use radioactive tracers; fMRI does not.  It is 
a basic MRI machine that is effectively tuned to pick up the difference between 
oxygenated and deoxygenated blood. 
This is how it basically works: a cognition or behavior of interest is mapped onto 
your functional brain anatomy based on this kind of principal—a subject, you or 
anyone who performs a task.  In this case, the picture represents a symbol of a 
finger-tapping task, which is going to activate to the multiprime and the motor cortex 
in the opposite sides that, of course, runs to that finger. The increased neuronal 
activity is strongly correlated with an increase in oxygenated blood flow, although 
there is a timeline. One of the theoretical reasons behind this is that neurons 
themselves do not store energy; they don’t store oxygen or glucose.  So, once the 
neuron has depleted its energy reserve, it sends signals to other neurons to make 
things happen. It needs to be replenished and you get this increase in oxygenated 
blood, which brings all sorts of nutrients and oxygen. Oxygenated and deoxygenated 
blood have very different magnetic properties, and the magnetic resonance scanner 
                                                                
6
 No Lie MRI, http://noliemri.com/ (last visited June 1, 2009).   
7
 Amen Clinics, http://www.amenclinics.com/ (last visited June 1, 2009).  
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can pick these up. After much processing, we can end up creating what you pictured, 
that you’re probably more used to seeing, a pre-activation map.  
fMRI is a fairly young technology. It’s definitely in its teenage years.  It was 
discovered in about 1990. And we’re going to emphasize a couple of points in this 
topic: that fMRI inventors correlate neural activity but not neural activity directly.  
This is an extremely complex and, as yet, poorly-understood relationship.  And just 
in the last three months there have been a handful of papers questioning how strong 
this association really is.  Sometimes the papers have shown an influx of blood flow 
in the absence of any neuronal activity at all. So, this is an inferential to separate here 
that you’re looking at.  So just remember, when you see these pictures, you’re 
looking at blood flow, not of the actual firing of neurons, which is how information 
is transmitted to the brain. 
THE PRESENTERS’ THESIS 
The thesis of our paper, before we get into a little bit more of the science, is 
basically this:  that in terms of considering the utility of functional brain scanning, 
particularly fMRI, for evidentiary purposes, we think that Rule 403 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, which weighs the probative versus the prejudicial value, is going 
to do the most work in terms of determining whether or not this technology should 
be admitted. And just to save haste, the rule says:  Relevant evidence can be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.8 
PROBATIVE VALUE 
I’m going to talk briefly now about the probative value side of this. We think a 
proper analysis of the science should show that the probative value of fMRI 
addressed to questions of mental state is marginal at best. These are the number of 
reasons as to why we think fMRI has almost no probative value for assessing mens 
rea. I’ll move through these one by one with examples. The first is base rates and 
reference classes.  The second will be individual differences.  The third is the BOLD 
response.  The fourth is standardized methods. And the fifth and sixth are ecological 
validity and time travel.   
Base Rates and Reference Classes 
We’ll do base-rates and reference classes first. I’m going to go through a base-
rate problem here that is sort of specific to lie detection.  This is one of the 
applications, not that we deal with it specifically in this paper, but it is one that 
                                                                
8
 See FED. R. EVID. 403. To quote the rule: 
Rule 403. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or 
Waste of Time 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Id. 
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we’ve already seen being attempted to be admitted into court. And the problem here 
is that it’s not enough to say, “This technology is 90 percent accurate.” because there 
are different meanings of accuracy.  Do you mean it’s 90 percent accurate of ruling 
in the truth positives, ruling out false positives? 
Let me give you an example of what we call the “base-rate problem,” which has 
to do with basing.  For any test that classifies information into two categories—like a 
lie-detection test, lying or not lying—there are obviously four possibilities:  true 
positives, false positives, true negatives, false negatives.  So there are different 
measures that we’re interested in. 
I’m going to just walk through this example, because it’s easier to see a concrete 
example. Let’s say we have 100 travelers we want to screen.  Ten percent of them 
are lying—ten percent of them intend to blow up the plane.  So, a brain scan with 90 
percent specificity and 90 percent sensitivity sounds pretty good.  So, this is what 
cuts rates down. The 90 percent sensitivity says that we’re going to correctly allow 
81 people to go.  And these are our false positives, we’re going to accidentally detain 
nine people; too bad for them.  Our 90 percent specificity says we’re going to 
correctly detain nine people, and we’re going to let—this is going to be the guy that 
blows up the plane.  This is the false negative that we don’t want in this situation.  
What’s really important here, though, is that sensitivity and specificity aren’t the 
only two numbers that matter. What’s critical is what’s called positive predictive 
value.  Positive predictive value takes into account sensitivity, specificity and the 
base-rate prevalence, which, in this case percent.  But the positive predictive value is 
that when this scan says to detain someone 50 percent of the time it’s actually going 
to be wrong. It gets worse when the base-rates go down.  Let’s say we have a one 
percent prevalence.  Other things that include 1 percent prevalence are 
schizophrenia, psychopathy, probably murders—I mean, there are other things with 1 
percent prevalence that we know of. So, the example breaks down even more. So, 
we’re going to detain nine, but our positive predictive value now goes down to, at a 1 
percent prevalence rate the scan incorrectly says to detain 99 out of 108 people.  
We’re actually wrong 91.7 percent of the time. 
So, the take-away point here is when somebody tells you this is accurate or it 
works, you need to ask them, “What is your positive predictive value?  What is the 
base rate?”  This is a problem for my section.  And Teneille might talk more about 
this, with No Lie fMRI cases where we have no information—zero information—
about the base rate prevalence of lying in the general public.                        
 
MALE 1:   
 
You’re referring to lying in the context of these fMRIs, right? 
 
MS. MURPHY:   
 
Yes.  This applies to other lie-detection technologies, too. 
 
MALE 1:   
 
There’s a whole area of validity testing since the early ‘80s about positive or 
negative thinking power.  They take the base rate analysis as well.  And they’re 
fairly—by 99 or 98— 
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MS. MURPHY:   
 
Are you talking about the polygraph? 
 
MALE 1:   
 
No.  Simple validity testing.  Malingering and behavioral psychology. 
 
MS. MURPHY:   
 
That’s a different—we might know something more about that.  I’m talking 
specifically about this case.  But the point here is, that the Bazian analysis does break 
down like this, and these are our validities if you want to know any kind of 
diagnostic situation. 
 
MALE 1:   
 
That’s correct. (Inaudible) in more context. 
 
MS. MURPHY:   
 
In other context, yes. When we know more about it, the more information you 
have, the more you can say, “This is valid or not valid.”  
So, the other question besides the base rate is the reference class.  And by that I 
mean:  What is normal?  Who are we comparing this person to?  Can I show that the 
particular person in question has a mental abnormality, say, that’s underscored by a 
brain abnormality? Well, first I need something to compare him to. And, in this case, 
perhaps you’d want in a legal case your ideal average rational actor to the law who 
expects to obey the rules.  So I’m going take a bunch of people and compare that 
individual to a normal brain. Well, this is problematic.  First of all, who’s going to 
make up the normal group—people of the same sex, socioeconomic status, 
background, or people who are actual, if you have someone in question of violating 
the law, people who are in question who are law abiders? The other interesting thing 
about this is that experiments in general—basically all of what we know from 
functional brain imaging—are done on groups of subjects and is finding they’re 
averaged.  This is in part because the fMRI signal is indeed very subtle.  It’s a 
physiological signal that’s very, very subtle, so you need quite a lot of data to select 
out what are true signals versus what is called “background noise.”  
So, the law is generally interested in one person at a time.  So, the whole point of 
this slide is, that normal is a statistical creation and an entirely normal one.  We have 
to decide:  Who do we mean by normal to compare this person to?  And even if we 
do that, is it valid to compare one person’s data which might have extreme 
physiological noise with a nice, clean average reading? The take-away point here for 
anybody—a practitioner who is faced with this kind of thing—is you want to know 
who is in that normal class and what all of their scans look like.   
326 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 22:319 
Individual Differences 
And the reason for that is because one of the other major problems with brain 
scanning as evidence is individual differences. Indeed, we all have the same brains 
respectively, but they’re wired up in different ways and we use what we have in 
different ways. Here’s an example that shows the problematic nature of what I’m 
talking about in evidentiary context.  This is a particular vision of which you’re 
looking down on the slice through someone’s brain like this.  It’s called a “glass 
brain depiction.”  These nine normal people are doing an episodic memory retrieval 
test.  And circled in red on each individual person is the area voxel—in a brain 
scanning, a voxel like a 3-dimensional pixel of greatest per significant activation. 
What would happen is in the study, these nine people, their entire brain data is 
averaged and you get this.  This is the area involved in episodic memory retrieval 
because this is the part that pops out.  If you notice there’s very few, if any—
arguably only this guy—people in the normal group who look like the average. So, 
when you say, “Who’s in the normal group?  What is the average?” it really depends.  
An individual person who goes into the normal group could be compared and held 
up to the normal group saying, “This person is abnormal.” when, in fact, they 
themselves went into making that average. This is very, this is all completely obscure 
in most brain imaging studies, intentionally so.  But we think that’s highly 
problematic for this forensic use. Statisticians and scientists are working on this 
problem of the grouped individual inference, which is not just unique to 
neuroscience but particularly problematic. And someday we think these comparisons 
might be possible with stats of more powerful algorithms and analysis technique, but 
that power does not exist today. 
BOLD Response 
The BOLD response is another problem for probative value.  “BOLD” refers to 
“blood oxygen level dependent” response, and that is the oxygenation of blood is 
greater when an area has been activated or you’re looking at the differential in 
oxygenation. The reason for that, these are just recent papers, we don’t actually 
know yet as neuroscientists what the BOLD response really means. For example, we 
don’t know, when you get a spot in the brain that lights up, whether that represents 
input being received, internal processing in a module, or an output. The inhibition 
problem, which is one of my favorite areas I used to work on, 15 to 20 percent of the 
neurons in your brain are inhibitory neurons in that when they fire they inhibit the 
next neuron from firing.  This helps shift circuits so they can be used for more than 
one purpose. We don’t really know how inhibitory neurons work in the BOLD 
response. It seems like they don’t show up very well.  
The other point here is that what your brain is not doing can be just as important 
as what it is doing.  We’re not sure what the BOLD response tells us about that. 
Another physiological problem is astrocytes, which are the purported cells within the 
brain that do not think, do not transmit electrical impulse as information. They’ve 
been typically ignored in a lot of cognitive neuroscience research as, “Well, they’re 
there, but we don’t know what to do with them, so we ignore them.”  Recent papers 
strongly suggest that they affect the BOLD response in ways that we really don’t yet 
understand. And, as I mentioned earlier, a paper in January suggested that blood flow 
may not actually be coupled with neuronal activity itself, in which case it’s really 
hard to interpret what it means.   
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So, this graph here is just to remind you that the signal that we’re looking at is 
very, very, very small and sensitive. This is the brain’s sort of energy budget. This is 
our intrinsic activity. With evoked activity, such as stimulating somebody to do a 
task or stimulating someone to tell a lie, there’s going to be a very small fraction of 
the overall brain energy usage.  To filter out a meaningful signal is very hard to do. 
The take-away point here is that fMRI is not yet in and of itself completely 
understood.  It’s great as a research tool, especially to develop other questions, but it 
has limitations, it is not yet a mind-reading machine. The standardized methods, it’s 
a prong of the Daubert9 analysis, and I’m just going to talk about one aspect of that 
in terms of probative value.  And the reason we bring this up is because brain 
images, when you process them from the raw data to get these pretty pictures, can be 
manipulated in several different ways.   
For example, it appears in this slide that the image on the left has much more 
activation than the image on the right. And, Your Honor, I submit that my client, 
who is on the right, clearly has deficient brain activity and, therefore, should not be 
held responsible for his or her crime. However, these are all images of the same set 
of brains, averaged at different statistical thresholds.  The lower the threshold the less 
of that signal we’re going to see.  The choice of the statistical threshold can 
drastically affect the interpretation of brain scanning results. And there are multiple 
statistical programs and analysis packages in use across labs, but no industry or 
academic-wide standardization. One of the things we do offer in our paper at the end 
is a list of questions that we think the judge could ask of the offering party to assess 
the robustness and validity of the processing methods and statistical analyses of the 
raw data.  We also think that these people should be able to ask for the raw data and 
rerun the analysis. There is so much that goes on in the computer that could be 
obscured, and this is what neurologist Helen Tabor, who has testified in a number of 
cases, calls “the opportunity to dial a defect either knowingly or unknowingly.”  
Ecological Validity 
The last two points here are ecological validity and time travel.  With ecological 
validity, the problem here that we think is that defining mens rea—which is a legal 
term of art and not something that neuroscientists use in our day-to-day life in a way 
that it could be captured by a functional imaging experiment—is not something that I 
think anyone is going to agree on for quite some time. Furthermore, we think 
something as slippery as intent can obviously vary between contexts and different 
motivational states. Note that to have a brain scan, the subject must be highly 
compliant and sit in a tight space with your head fixed in a frame, and be willing to 
hold very, very still and participate in the task.  There’s just no way that that is, in an 
ecological way, like the time of the incident in question.  That would be a sort of 
very silly assertion, in my opinion. They’re not the same conditions in which 
someone has committed a crime, and it certainly isn’t taking place at the same time. 
We do not have any information as to how someone’s motivational state or 
someone’s belief state, or how many times somebody has rehearsed a set of 
questions; or it might be displaying counter measures, like thinking about a pink 
elephant. Thinking about anything else could disrupt or alter a particular brain scan. 
                                                                
9
 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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Time Travel 
The last point is time travel.  And by this we mean there is distance between the 
time of the crime and the time of the assessment.  In the Savinon case that I 
mentioned in the beginning, this distance was six months—a time in which not only 
could someone change their mind or practice or rehearse their story, but in which 
significant brain plasticity could occur.  Gross lesions or tumors may still be visible, 
but that’s not what we’re talking about here.  We’re talking about functional imaging 
and mental state. Six months is more than enough time for someone with a mental 
disease or defect to go into remission or to decompensate and get worse. Obviously, 
the courts are making assessments about past mental states based on a person’s 
present condition all the time. That’s what courts and juries are meant to do. We’re 
just saying here that we shouldn’t have great expectations that brain imaging is going 
to add any particularly strong probative value to this type of assessment. And with 
that, I’m going to turn it over to Teneille, who’s going to bring it back to our thesis.  
We went over the probative side, she’s going to talk about the prejudicial side. 
POTENTIAL FOR PREJUDICE 
MS. BROWN:   
So, Emily spoke about the probative value aspect, and you can see it’s a 
balancing test.  You’re probably all fairly familiar with test 403 or your counterpart 
here in Ohio.10  I’m going to talk about potential for prejudice. And we don’t yet 
have a lot of empirical data on this, but we don’t need to because you can just 
analogize the other types of evidence and see what the potential for prejudice is.  
And, on balance, if the probative value is substantially outweighed by this potential 
for prejudice, this is an evidentiary rule that can exclude all types of evidence, not 
just scientific evidence. 
And why 403?  We’ve been asked this by a number of scientific evidence 
experts. And the reason we’re interested in 403 is it really brings up our thesis about 
the prejudice and the unique and persuasive power of these images. As Emily stated, 
here’s the rule: substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  And I’m 
going to walk through some of the different types of prejudice, including confusing 
the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay and waste, and also representing 
cumulative evidence, which is cumulative social psychological evidence, which is 
actually better in this case. 
 
So why not 702?11 Does Ohio have Frye12 or are you a Daubert State? 
 




                                                                
10
 See OHIO R. EVID. 403. 
11
 FED. R. EVID. 702 (rule governing testimony by experts).   
12
 Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  
13
 See Miller v. Bike Athletic Co., 80 Ohio St.3d 607 (Ohio 1998) (adopting the Daubert 
test and rejecting the Frye test).  
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MS. BROWN:   
 
You’re a Daubert state. Okay. 
So, the question is:  Why not try to include this under the rules that are 
specifically targeted at scientific evidence? And we could have in that we do think 
that a lot of our arguments and a lot of the points that Emily raised that go to 
probative value actually speak to the weak validity of brain imagining under a 
Daubert type of test.  And the reason we didn’t focus on Daubert in our paper, we’re 
very interested in: if the science develops, becomes better, and becomes valid for 
particular uses, then what?  What about this potential for prejudice and the effect that 
these images themselves will have on the jury?      
And there’s more of a practical test in 403, looking at the waste and looking at 
the cost of these scans, and it’s a little more flexible to allow for changes in the 
methodology.  But even so, this clearly could be excluded under Daubert or Frye.  
And the reason being is—for our particular purpose of looking at past mental 
states—it’s not peer reviewed and valid and tested for that purpose. 
“Epistemic Mismatch” 
But we’re focusing here on 403. At the first prong -- I’m going to go through 
each of these in turn.  But the first potential for prejudice is something that Adina 
Roskies has called the “epistemic mismatch.” And that’s where there’s a difference 
between what you think you’re seeing and the image, what you think it can convey, 
and what it actually conveys, and all the steps that are required to get to the 
construction of that image. So, you see a picture of a brain—an fMRI image is 
referred to a snapshot of the brain—and you think it’s actually frozen in time.  This 
is someone’s picture of someone’s brain or a video of someone’s brain at some given 
point in time. And what you still don’t see are all these heavy levels and multiple 
steps of processing that occur with the dialing of defects, with the picking the 
statistical package and all of the many discretionary steps that a researcher could 
engage in to clean up the data. Also, it’s not done to distort the data, but it can have 
that effect if you have a particular legal argument you wanted to make.  
Here is a representation of this epistemic mismatch where you start with the 
fMRI signal and go to the BOLD response and walk through each of these steps that 
are required to end up on the upper right with this past or future behavior.  And that’s 
the legally relevant question, but it requires all these many inferential steps, and at 
any step of the process, you could be weakening the value of the inferential change.  
So, by the  time you get the projection forward for some future date that’s in question 
or looking back to see if someone had the requisite mental state, it’s a very, very 
weak statement to make. And it’s possible, certainly, and as Emily mentioned, these 
are the kinds of steps that are taken in other types of evidence as well, but the fact 
that the image blurs this process and doesn’t make it obvious that you’re going from 
a signal of the BOLD response in correlation with greater energy consumption all the 
way up to the past or future behavior or mental state.  That’s the problem with this 
evidence is that this is not obvious—all of these steps are not obvious. And, in fact, 
the final step when you’re looking at the past or future behavioral mental state, this is 
something that really requires a lot of empirical research with cognitive psychology 
and a lot of agreement among psychologists as to what that behavior means. And it’s 
certainly prone to confirmation bias if you think that you’re looking for a specific 
type of behavior. 
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Undue Weight of Evidence 
The second potential for prejudice is that people will give this image exaggerated 
weight.  You might think of a gruesome photo or computer-animated images that 
might also fall under this category for potential for prejudice.  And this slide captures 
this undue weight that’s given to the images.  Emily and I were at a training for 
judges in November of 2007, where someone whose job it is actually to train judges 
on how to assess this evidence presented fMRI as “magical” and it would be 
admitted under any jurisdiction regardless of the scientific Daubert or Frye tests, and 
kind of apprised us of what purpose it would be used for. And the reason being is 
that it had been in 20,000 peer review journals; it was incredibly objective and it was 
basically going to save the day.   
And the problem with this, obviously, is that it’s not magical.  Just because some 
process involves computers or algorithms, it doesn’t mean that there’s not a human 
involved to decide how to construct those algorithms.  So, this is just getting at that 
idea that brain images are not magical. There’s also something called “neurorealism” 
and “neuroessentialism,” where it promises, fMRI seems to promise—and if you saw 
the CBS video clip,14 there’s discussion about that—where you think you’re seeing 
you yourself in the brain, it’s represented in the brain.  And you are your brain in a 
way that you’re not any other organ in your body.  And you wouldn’t think of you 
being your liver or your gut.  You are your brain, and that is kind of the reduction of 
who you are. And so, it’s covered in the media, getting into neurorealism.  This is the 
way that brain imaging in often discussed. You’ve seen it in the headlines: this is 
your brain on politics, or God, or a Super Bowl ad.  And they’re always 
accompanied by pictures of brains dotted with seemingly significant splotches of 
color.  Now, some scientists have seen enough.  We’re like moths, they say, lured by 
the flickering lights of neuroimaging and uncritically accepting of conclusions drawn 
from it. So, it’s obviously being covered in the media quite a bit, and it’s often done 
with this very kind of starry-eyed gaze into what it can promise.  And that’s 
definitely a potential for prejudice because of the way it’s discussed and the way it’s 
represented. 
Cumulative Evidence 
The third potential for prejudice is that brain images are actually cumulative with 
other types of evidence.  As Emily mentioned in the construction of the image, you 
have to start with some tasks, some statements or behavior, something that would 
then be triggering the BOLD response to activation in the brain.  And so, if you have 
that, then why do you need the brain imaging if all it does is bolster the social-type 
qualities?  
An example of this would be the Savinon case that Emily discussed.  If you have 
behavior at the time of the crime, you have a criminal defendant saying and the 
victim—who is a rare case where we actually have a victim who can speak and 
testify as to what happened at the time of the crime—she’s saying, “He waited 
outside of my apartment.  He tied me up.  I somehow convinced him to let me go.  
                                                                
14
 See How Technology May Soon “Read” Your Mind, CBS NEWS, Jan. 4, 2009, available 
at http://www.cbsnews. com/stories/2008/12/31/60minutes/main4694713.shtml (last visited 
June 1, 2009) (article includes the video of a segment on fMRI technology which aired in 
CBS’s 60 Minutes).  
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He pleaded with me, ‘Don’t tell the cops. I’m going to take you back to your 
apartment. I’ll help you bandage your wounds.  I’m going to give you a phone to call 
911 for help, but don’t tell them I was involved.’” That speaks to his mental state at 
the time of the crime in a way that’s so much more than what an after-the-fact brain 
image can tell us.   
And maybe it’s not always perfect, and we don’t always have behavior at the 
time of the crime we can draw inferences from about mental state, but when we do 
have that, then the brain image really adds nothing. It’s incredibly expensive and 
because of all the other potentials for prejudice, it’s something that could be 
eliminated based on the cumulative nature.  
So, here, this is another way of representing this.  When you’re constructing the 
image, the B state is the experimental state, so that’s when you give the subject a 
task that they have to do, something that you’ve asked them to get some emotional 
process. It’s something that’s supposed to be representing their ability to form intent. 
Emily’s point is a very good one, too, that “intent”: what does that mean?  Criminal 
mens rea, intent in a neuroscience setting, it’s very specific to the type of action 
you’re taking. But here, you have this B state where there’s an activation state from 
the experiment.  You’re subtracting a control state, which might be resting or might 
be doing some other task that’s not engaging the ability to form intention.  And then, 
you subtract the two, and you’re looking at the difference in the activation between 
the experimental state and the controlled state.  And this just brings home the point 
again that if you’re looking at behavior subtracting from a control state, and then 
looking at the brain image that results, why don’t you just look at the behavior and 
what does this add? 
“Psycho-Legal Error” 
And the fourth type of prejudice is something called the “psycho-legal error.”  
It’s the fundamental psycho-legal error.  It’s coined by Stephen Morse, who’s a law 
professor at the University of Pennsylvania. And what this gets at is if you can 
somehow identify something that’s occurring or being collared by the brain that, 
therefore, that should automatically lead to mitigation. And there is the tendency to 
think that if you can construct a story that leads up to the brain and it’s the cause of 
the behavior that’s in the brain, that, therefore, that leads to mitigation. And, of 
course, this isn’t the case because, as Emily mentioned, everything begins in the 
brain.  So, just because you can show that something has a functional correlate and it 
begins in the brain, that shouldn’t lead to mitigation, but it often does in the way that 
these cases are argued.  So, that’s a potential for prejudice just because you need to 
take that basis from functional thought, and just because you show that someone’s 
brain looks different, it doesn’t mean that it acts differently. 
Impairs Ability to Assess Evidence 
And the fifth potential for prejudice is that it actually impairs people’s ability to 
assess evidence.  And this is where we actually have preliminary empirical data. It’s 
not done on mock jury, and that’s something that we’re working on with the 
MacArthur Project, is actually taking this sort of situation and apply it to a mock 
jury.  But we’ll walk through a few, two preliminary studies that explain this final 
potential for prejudice. 
So, here we have an explanation of something called “the curse of knowledge.”  
And this is a research design where subjects were given this explanation, and you 
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can read it over with me.  Subjects were given the description of this phenomenon, 
the curse of knowledge, and then they were offered explanations. And they were 
supposed to rate how satisfying they found the explanation for this phenomenon.  
And this study was done at Yale.  
Curse of knowledge is when you know something, and so you assume everybody 
knows it.  And we all have friends like this, where they know what the capital of 
some country is, and if you don’t know it they’re shocked.  But just because they 
know something, they think it’s wide-spread knowledge.   
And so, then, the subjects were given explanations of this behavior and asked 
whether or not they thought the explanations were good or bad. So, the bad 
explanation for the behavior is circular.  And it takes a little while to read through 
this to see that it, in fact, is circular because it doesn’t add anything more than what 
the subjects were first told; it just restates the same thing. The researchers claim that 
this curse happens because subjects make more mistakes when they have to judge the 
knowledge of others. People are much better at judging what they themselves know. 
So, in the experiment, they were actually just re-stating what they had already told 
the subject. And the good explanation adds something.  It adds some explanation that 
wasn’t given before.  In this case, it talks about the point of view and the inability to 
switch your point of view to see that someone else may, in fact, not know this. And 
what’s encouraging is, that subjects were pretty good at differentiating between the 
good explanation and the bad explanation.  
But then, you add this neuro-babble, and you say, “Brain scans indicate...and 
there’s something going on in the frontal lobe where it’s known to be involved in 
self-knowledge.”  And you add that to the good and the bad explanation, and what 
happens is here on the left where you don’t have the neuroscience evidence, it’s an 
unsatisfying explanation.  When you add the neuro-babble on the right, it goes from 
being a bad explanation to not a great explanation, but at least a good explanation, 
better than it was before, just by saying, “Brain scans indicate.”  And so you see they 
can tell the difference between a good and bad explanation.  But when you add the 
neuro-babble, it somehow makes the bad explanation look better than it is, even 
though it doesn’t add any explanatory power. 
And another study that was done is the McCabe & Castel study. This is taking it 
one step further and not just looking at whether or not neuroscience evidence was 
presented, but looking at the format of the evidence and whether it makes a 
difference if it’s presented as a brain image itself.  So, subjects were given various 
statements like this one: “Watching TV helps with math ability because both activate 
the temporal lobe.”  Obviously this is a logical fallacy because just because two 
things happen at once, we all know from our LSAT test, that doesn’t mean they’re 
correlated. It doesn’t mean that one helps the other. So, subjects were just given this 
statement.  And then, they were supposed to rate how scientifically reasonable they 
thought it was, how sensible this explanation was.  And they were given different 
types of information along with this statement.  So, some subjects were just told to 
read this: “Watching TV helps with math because they both activate the temporal 
lobe.”  Some were given this information, plus a graph which is supposed to show 
that both TV watching and math, they’re both interacting the temporal lobe to about 
the same degree.  And then, a third group of subjects were given statements with this 
brain image, where it’s supposed to show that they both activate the temporal lobe to 
a similar degree.  And it was one of those three that the subjects were placed into. 
And you can see here from this graph that it’s not just the fact that this is visual 
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information. There’s something about the brain image that takes you from saying 
that this is a somewhat sensible argument to now it’s much more—this statement 
makes much more sense just because you put a brain image next to it.  And it’s not 
just the visual because the bar graph didn’t have that effect. It’s something about the 
brain image itself. And this is preliminary data.   
We didn’t get many examples of different types of phenomena they were asking 
the subjects about, but this is something that we’re hoping to follow up with and see 
if we can test this and control for other things like cross-examination, and if you 
could still this effect, that a brain image can make an argument more powerful.  That 
seems like a pretty clear-cut case of prejudice.  You have an argument that’s bad; 
you put a brain image next to it, and now it’s better.  
So, to conclude here, as Emily mentioned, this is happening right now.  It’s 
pervasive, it’s persuasive, and it’s already upon us.  And the technology isn’t perfect, 
but people think that it is.  And one issue that comes up here is people blur the uses.  
So, you have something that’s very useful in a research context—or you can think of 
a blood pressure pump that’s really good at measuring your blood pressure, but then 
if you try to take that same pump and use it to determine whether or not someone is 
lying, or maybe some theory that if they’re stressed their blood pressure will 
increase, it’s not validated for that purpose.  But that’s what’s happening here is that 
people are trying to blur all the purposes together, and say, “Look, it’s being used to 
track Alzheimer’s progress and stroke victims, and so, therefore, we’re going to use 
it to see whether or not someone is depressed and whether or not they had the intent 
to kill someone in a murder case,” which is a totally different usage.  
But there is a recent case in San Diego—Emily actually wrote this case; we can 
send you our blog address where you can read about it.15 It was an individual, it was 
a dependency hearing—I’m going to be careful of what I say here because a lot of it 
is confidential, which might be why they tried to introduce it in this case—so, it’s a 
dependancy case where an individual, a 14-year-old girl was arguing that she had 
been—she wasn’t herself arguing, but the State and the welfare organization were 
arguing—that she had been sexually abused. And her father was introducing brain 
imagining evidence to argue that when he made the statement that he did not 
sexually assault his daughter, he’s telling the truth. So, it’s not used to detect a lie; 
he’s using it to verify the fact that he’s telling the truth.   
And what’s really troubling about this is California is a Frye-type state, so it’s 
whether or not this evidence is generally accepted in the relevant scientific 
community. And the problem was this is a sealed case; it’s a dependancy hearing. 
So, if they hadn’t succeeded in getting it in, nobody would know.  But we happened 
to be contacted by the State welfare services’ counsel, who was really concerned 
about this, and he saw the report.  The report is not public. But he saw the report 
where even internally, there were some inconsistencies in the conclusions that were 
drawn from the scientists.  But then, they were ready to say, “This is generally 
accepted in the field.  This is a valid way to tell whether or not somebody is telling 
                                                                
15
 See Emily Murphy, No Lie MRI Being Offered as Evidence in Court, Stanford Center 
for Law & the Biosciences Blog, Mar. 14, 2009, available at 
http://lawandbiosciences.wordpress.com/2009/03/14/no-lie-mri-being-offered-as-evidence-in-
court/  (last visited June 1, 2009).  
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the truth.” And you’ve got this young woman who’s trying to go up against a brain 
image that her father is introducing, saying that he’s telling the truth when he said he 
didn’t abuse her.  And the problem is, if it’s the general acceptance by the relevant 
community standard, the whole problem with the test like Frye is that you’ve got this 
small pocket of people who are actually researching this field. And the broader base 
of the community is fMRI researchers, they responded very loudly, saying, “There’s 
no way this is generally accepted in the broader fMRI community.” If you want to 
look just at the community of commercial researchers, who are trying to flip around 
to make money in this lie detection contest, that’s, like, four people. And if you ask 
them, they’ll say it’s generally accepted because they’re conflicted in their interests 
and they have investors who are going to make money based on this.  But that sort of 
gets back to the whole problem of polygraphs. And the difference between Frye and 
Daubert. This is one area where the difference between Frye and Daubert, it’s a 
huge practical difference, unless you look at the relevant distance in the scientific 
community, which is in pretty wide agreement that the fMRI technology that was 
used in this particular case is not valid and it’s not an appropriate use at all.  
And fortunately the outcome of that was we were contacted by the counsel, we 
got involved.  We were trying to just help them get up to speed on how they can 
challenge this. There was a Kelly16 hearing, which is the equivalent of the Frye 
hearing in California, where the father was trying to introduce this and get it 
approved.  I don’t know exactly what happened as to why they withdrew the request, 
but the Defendant’s counsel was ready to put on a pretty good challenge against this 
evidence. And he contacted Mark Rakel (phonetic), who is a member of the Long 
Arm Stanton Project and a senior Nobel-caliber PET imaging researcher at 
Washington and St. Louis, and he was ready to fly back to San Diego to testify, to 
say this wasn’t generally accepted in the field.  And there was enough noise online 
with people responding to our blog saying, “I can’t believe this would ever be 
acceptable.” Before the father’s counsel knew that Mark Rakel was going to be the 
expert witness, they withdrew the request probably because, I would speculate, they 
wanted to test the waters. And once they realized there was going to be this very 
physical public response to their introduction, then they stepped back and thought, 
“Maybe this isn’t the right case to be doing this.  We don’t want our first time we 
attempt to introduce this publicly, in case it’s not accepted.”  So, it’s a very real live 
case that was last week when they withdrew the request.17 
So, the conclusion here: at present, is fMRI a valid method for measuring mental 
states that are relevant to mens rea? No. Is there a danger of unfair prejudice? Yes. 
Are there alternative forms of mens rea evidence that are at least as probative and 
less prejudicial?  This is the old sheet packs where you have to look and see if there 
are alternative forms, which there are and they’re less prejudicial, then you go with 
that. So, in this case, it would be the behavior at the time of the crime. With the 
Savinon case, the alternative form of mens rea evidence is the victim’s testimony 
about what was the cover up and the concealment that the defendant tried to engage 
                                                                
16
 See People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976) (adopting the Frye test).  
17
 See Teneille Brown, Request to Admit No Lie MRI Report in California Case is 
Withdrawn, Stanford Center for Law & the Biosciences Blog, Mar. 25, 2009, available at 
http://lawandbiosciences.wordpress.com/2009/03/25/ request-to-admit-no-lie-mri-report-in-
california-case-is-withdrawn/ (last visited June 1, 2009). 
2008-09] THROUGH A SCANNER DARKLY 335 
in. And given the current status of the science, fMRI evidence should be excluded so 
that neither judges nor jurors are prejudiced.  
That’s sort of a take-home point from our talk, but we’d also be totally open to a 
question-and-answer session that follows after that to answer questions about any 
other quirky things that you think might be interesting: constitutional questions; the 
5th Amendment; whether or not this might be considered testimonial evidence and 
whether or not it would indicate your ability not to incriminate yourself; 4th 
Amendment issues; hearsay issues.  There are all sorts of very interesting evidentiary 
and Constitutional issues—6th Amendment issues, that we have this argument that 
tends to be addressed to criminal defendants, would they maybe have a 6th 
Amendment right to possess this exculpatory evidence because it has to be reliable 
and probably wouldn’t be allowed to be looked at it in the 6th Amendment?  But 
anyway, all these things are free.  If you want to chat, you can go ahead and ask 
some questions now, unless you wanted to add anything as kind of a conclusion. 
 
MS. MURPHY:   
 
Only to say that we’re very glad to take questions.  We recognize that this is a 
very controversial area, and we recognize this is a very new and young area. This is a 
30,000-word paper.  There are a lot of details both technical, scientifically technical, 
and legal that we’ve gone through quite quickly here.  So, if you want more detail, 
feel free to ask us.  But we’re happy to take questions.  And we want to say thanks to 
all of these people, and thank you for having us here today. 
 
FEMALE 1:   
 
If this question is too elemental, just skip it.  I’m curious on what they showed 
the jury to convict the Indian woman when she poisoned whoever she was poisoning.  
Were they sketches of brain scans and they thought she was lying or what? 
 
MS. BROWN:   
 
What’s interesting about this case is that there actually wasn’t a jury.  It was 
something like an inquisitorial method where it’s one judge who’s receiving 
evidence and who makes the decision and also assists a jury and fact-finder. 
And this is the field methodology, and maybe we can show you.  What it’s doing 
is reading statements where they’re saying—this case was about poisoning and 
whether or not this woman poisoned her ex-fiance—and so, reading statements 
leading up to the crime, which are, “I bought the arsenic.  I went to the temple, I 
picked up the Versed.  I laced the Versed with the arsenic.  I gave the arsenic to 
Houdi (phonetic),” who’s her ex.”  And then, seeing if there was some sort of 
recognition in her brain, that her brain recognized—it was EEG, this was not 
functional magnetic resonance imaging, it was an EEG.  Electrodes on the scalp, 
which was supposed to measure the electro activity when they mentioned these 
statements to her. And the idea was, we’d have a P300 (phonetic) wave of 
recognition, but there’s no ability currently to differentiate between whether you 
recognize that stimuli because you know what the charges are against you. And so if 
you hear someone read back the charge sheet of, “You bought the arsenic, you 
poisoned your ex-fiance,” if your brain looks overactive because you recognize that, 
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it might be because you know what you’re charged with and not because you 
engaged in the behavior and actually bought the arsenic and actually poisoned your 
ex-fiance. 
 
MS. MURPHY:   
 
Just to say a word about the technology: it’s a brain scan in which it measures 
functional activity, but you don’t get the pretty picture.  It’s an EEG, which is a cap 
of electrodes that anybody can wear, including a baby, that measures recordable 
activity, just superficial brain activity, nothing you can see; whereas, an fMRI and 
other things can get in the whole brain. And it works basically like this. 
 
MS. BROWN:   
 




The EEG noise, like all other brain physiological signals, is very noisy.  So, in 
this case, this person would be listening to a sound, say, “I bought the arsenic,” 
which was one of the questions that this woman was read.  And then, the actual 
measurement that comes out of her brain is like this.  They then repeat, and as I said 
with the fMRI scanning, you repeat trials dozens and hundreds to times, and 
sometimes you average or often average cross subjects because this trace here is so 
noisy.  But when you do it over 100 trials, you can get what’s called the “event-
related potential.” Again, though, repetition of things a number of times, we think, is 
very problematic. There’s adaptation in brain; there’s no comparison.  What 
happened in that trial is, they made these statements, they read them to her, and then 
the computer created a report. So, obviously, there was no bias because it was the 
computer who did it.  And all they submitted was the computer evidence.  We never 
saw any brain-trace evidence in that particular case. 
 
MS. BROWN:   
 
But it’s a really good question because it is problematic because we don’t have 
peer-review data on this methodology.  It’s very private. It’s a forensic lab out of 
Dubai, India.  And if you look at the case itself, the facts against this individual were 
incredibly weak; it was all circumstantial. The inferences were always drawn against 
her, where, “Oh, she stayed in this hotel, which was right by her ex-fiance’s house.” 
Clearly, she could have poisoned him, or maybe it’s because it’s a cheap hotel, or 
maybe because it has sentimental value with her current husband. But the inferences 
were always drawn in a way that’s very negative towards this woman.  
And so, this—it’s is called BEOS technology—seemed to play a very important 
role in convicting her because the other evidence was so weak.  And, “Look, we 
have this EEG data that makes her look very guilty.”  But the troubling part is that 
there’s not any good peer review that looks at the methodology to see if we can do 
that.  And when we talked to researchers at Stanford who are engaged in similar 
types of research, they say that it’s impossible to be able to get at the source of the 
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knowledge and the difference between experiencing an event and having some brain 
recognition activation versus being aware of it after the fact.  
And I don’t know if you watched the CBS video where John Dylan-Haynes was 
taking people through the video game, or looking at houses or looking at rooms, and 
then later showing them some of those visuals and putting them in rooms that they 
didn’t see and being able to detect the rooms that they had seen from the rooms that 
they had not seen.18 And the problem there is it seems like it’s very interesting work.  
But what’s the legal application?  Because what are the odds in a real world setting 
that you would be able to control the stimuli that someone has seen? They were able 
to construct this room that they know you haven’t seen before, and then test you 
again to see if you remember it. But if you’re talking about a knife or a gun, chances 
are we’ve all seen knives and guns, and so your brain might look like it’s responding 
and it’s familiar with the stimuli of a gun, but it doesn’t mean that you were the one 
who committed the crime.  It might look like your grandmother’s gun, or it might 
look like a gun you saw on CSI.  And so, you can’t differentiate from the source, and 
that makes this very problematic. 
 
MS. MURPHY:   
 
The other disturbing thing about this particular technology is that it’s now being 
deployed in two forensic labs in two different Indian states.  We haven’t seen any 
negative press or any negative data, judicial opinions, against this technology in 
particular.  In fact, it was advocated saying, “It’s so hard to get inside the criminal’s 
mental state, especially if they’re really clever and wanted to conceal it. So, we 
should use this more particularly in difficult cases.”  That’s something that really 
concerns me. 
 
MS. BROWN:   
 
And we talked about the San Diego case; that father could have been thinking of 
India and ocean waves, or anything else, we don’t know what he was thinking of. He 
could have been engaged in these things to try not to look stressed out when they 
were reading the report. 
 
MALE 3:   
 
Last week, when the California case was pending, Cleveland had beautiful 
weather, and we were also involved in a real life matter where the fellow sitting next 
to me, there was testimony being given that he was psychotic based on his behavior. 
And the psychiatrist said, “Psychosis, paranoid type.”  And the accused, if you will, 
said, “Fine. Give me a brain scan.  And if it shows that my brain is unhealthy in this 
matter, I’ll trust your judgment.  Otherwise, I don’t think it’s accurate.” I’m just 
curious, what’s your response, not necessarily in an evidence sense, but in a 
scientific sense?  How capable is the equipment of measuring the health of a brain? 
 
MS. MURPHY:   
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That’s a great question because one of the major deployments of this technology 
in the clinical setting is to try to get a handle on mental illness and the varied kinds 
of mental illness. It’s for predictive purposes, for diagnostic purposes. And, 
particularly, one of the interesting sorts of secondary uses of that is to help people 
who have mental illness accept and realize mental illness and follow through with 
treatment. 
We’ve done a couple of survey-based studies that show that people who have 
been diagnosed with major depression would like a brain scan. And, in fact, if they 
have a brain scan, they rate themselves of being much more likely to follow through 
with treatment. Because somehow it gets the neuroessentialism thing, it really makes 
it real for them.  And in a strange way, it serves a purpose that I’m not comfortable 
with as a neuroscientist. It’s not consistent but it serves this purpose saying, “Oh, it’s 
not me, it’s my brain.”  And in that case, you say, “Well, I need to take care of my 
brain.  My brain is unhealthy.”  
But to get at your technical question, the use of brain scans to diagnose 
psychiatric illnesses is truly in its infancy, particularly flexible and acute states, like 
psychosis, things that come and go.  You’d have to get somebody while they were 
acutely psychotic.  We don’t have a lot of people who are acutely psychotic who 
have been in, or who are willing to go into, scanners. The most robust clinical use is 
for gross lesions, diagnosing if someone had a major stroke or other sort of brain 
damage type thing, dead tissue versus ischemic tissue.  In terms of mental illness, 
though, it’s stickier. The data is really kind of all over the place. I wouldn’t feel 
comfortable using it in a forensic capacity.  But if it were in a diagnostic capacity, 
where it was really serving the purpose of compelling someone to get treatment, 
that’s a grey area for me.  As long as that person wasn’t able to— 
 
MALE 4:   
 
The question is does it show up? 
 
MS. MURPHY:   
 
No.  Well, it depends. I mean, it doesn’t show up clearly.  I don’t think you could 
take that particular brain scan and say, you could not hand that to a radiologist and 
say, “Yeah, that person is psychotic.” 
 
MS. BROWN:   
 
The question is:  What do you compare this to?  Then it gets back to that base-
rate question of if the individual’s brain looks different, is it because they’re 
functioning differently?  If you had had a baseline test even of them and not a group 
of normals or averages, what would it have looked like in comparison to that? It may 
have been, if you had a brain scan before they started presenting this psychosis, it 
might look the exact same as when they’re psychotic. So, there are all sorts of 
problems of looking at the activation.  Some of the points Emily brought up: if you 
have reduced functioning in one area of the brain, it might not indicate dysfunction at 
all. It might be that you’re hyper-efficient and that you’ve just done something over 
and over again so that you’re very skilled at it, as opposed to it being a deficit.  So 
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there are all sorts of problems of using it for psychiatric diagnosis, one individual 
scan. 
 
MALE 5:   
 
Danny Wibers (phonetic) in 1986 using, I think it was 10, he showed 
hypofrontality in patients with schizophrenia.  The problem is you get the same 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, you get the same thing that Mayberg has found with 
depression. So, you just cannot diagnose somebody.  It’s basically a diagnosis based 
on behavior and systems, behavioral symptoms, not on what’s going on in the brain. 
And they tried a similar thing with the Unabomber based upon that cognitive test 
pattern.  Defense wanted to say he had schizophrenia because he didn’t want to 
acknowledge that he had a mental illness.  And you can’t do it whether it’s cognitive 
test patterns, whether it’s patterns in the brain scan. It has certain phenomenal logical 
symptoms, and that’s the basis of the diagnosis. 
 
MS. BROWN:   
 
I think that might be exactly why certain attorneys want to use the brain images 
because it’s really all entirely based on the psychological data and they’re bringing in 
the brain image often just to prejudice the jury, for that purpose, which it is done.  
Because it doesn’t do any extra explanatory work other than making it seem very 
concrete and objective.  And a hypothesis is that juries are very reluctant or skeptical 
to receive psychological data and they think there’s too much opportunity for 
malingering, and somehow the brain image is going to get around that.  And it’s so 
objective that you won’t be able to detect malingering, but, in fact, there’s so many 
steps in constructing— 
 
MALE 5:   
 
In fact, it can detect malingering, especially a higher degree of (inaudible).  So I 
agree with them, that’s behavioral.  (Inaudible). 
 
MS. BROWN:   
 
The work being done in all these images is all for the behavior.  And the image 
adds this pretty picture to sort of summarize what you already knew through the 
psychological exam. 
 
MALE 5:   
 
The testing will give you much more information that’s relevant and what’s 
going on. 
 




MALE 5:   
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Validity testing.  It’s a complicated area.  But nonetheless, what they do is they 
look at contrasts.  They have analogues considered malingering, they have a spare 
TBI, a model TBI, those are previously entailed in validity testing.  And you 
compare those contrasts.  There’s nothing comparable to that in this whole area.  
And the test/retest, from my ability (inaudible). 
 
MS. BROWN:   
 
Depends upon which measure you’re talking about. 
 
MALE 5:   
 
Basically, it’s very low because they don’t correlate cross measures, different 
scanners, different machines. 
 
MS. BROWN:   
 
Which is why cross-examination wouldn’t take care of it. 
 
MALE 5:   
 
They give you different levels (inaudible).  (Inaudible) is huge. 
 
MALE 6:   
 
Actually, I just wanted to ask a question.  I’m assuming I kind of heard the 
answer more or less. I had a client a couple years ago who passed a polygraph with 
flying colors, and a few months later he confessed to the crime and he gave details 
that only he would know he did it.  He passed the polygraph because he was 
psychotic.  And honestly, at that point, he believed he didn’t do it.  There’s no 
allowance for any of that here, is there? 
 
MS. MURPHY:   
 
No.  Indeed, we have no data one way or the other to know whether or not brain 
scanning could say, “This guy might be passing the lie detector test, but it turns out 
he’s psychotic.”  We have no way of knowing.  And indeed, all the brain scan lie 
detector test studies—there are about two dozens that they’ve published—have been 
done with healthy, right-handed, age 18 to 40, individuals.  So anyone outside of that 
range—anyone with mental illness, for example, or a history of addiction—we have 
no idea of the validity of the test for that kind of person. 
 
MS. BROWN:   
 
And if they convince themselves they really thought they were telling the truth, 
you might not see that. 
 
MALE 5:   
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A large amount of your defendants are going to have mental issues. 
 
MS. BROWN:   
 
Exactly. And because we have no way to engage in better measures, you 
wouldn’t know exactly what it is they’re actually thinking when you measure their 
brain. 
 
MALE 7:   
 
You were mentioning earlier, getting into some of the constitutional implications, 
say self-incrimination, where do you think the judge would come down in terms of 
self-incrimination? 
 
MS. BROWN:   
 
I think in terms of the use again of what the stimuli is.  Because if you’re asking 
someone to make a statement as they were in the India case, in that case they were 
reading her statements and checking on the response.  
So, Nida Farahani (phonetic), she’s a professor at Vanderbilt, she has written on 
this -- I don’t know if it’s been published yet. It has? Okay. She has written a really 
great article looking at this very question, looking at other predicates and whether or 
not things were thought of as testimony in the past. Because you know there are 
many Supreme Court cases that allow for DNA testing, blood testing, Schuber and 
all those in that line of cases.  So, if it’s in analogy to that, then it’s a 4th Amendment 
issue and not a 5th Amendment issue. But if you think of something about the fact 
that you’re requiring the subjects to respond in some way, even if it’s a brain 
activation in response to someone else’s statement, if that’s thought of as 
testimonials, then you could think of this as being a 5th Amendment issue and not 
being able to order a brain image.  Although, for practical reasons, you wouldn’t be 
able to order a fMRI scan now because the defendant would just need to move a tiny 
bit or breathe really heavily and move their tongue and swallow and it would 
invalidate the data.  So, they’re practical, probably compelling the test now, but at 
least theoretically they’re very interesting questions about whether or not it might be 
considered testimony.  
 
MS. BROWN:   
 
Thank you very much. 
